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THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
CORPORATIONS
(Continued)
CRIMINAL INTENT
The argument that a corporation cannot have a criminal intent, which the Roman law anticipated and accepted,
is more formidable. 4 The argument is that as a corporation is not a real but merely a fictitious thing it cannot
have a real intent, nor can the intent of others be imputed
to it. It presents three inquiries: (1) Is a corporation a
real thing; (2) if so, can it have a real intent; or, (3) can
the intent of others be imputed to it.
A CORPORATION IS A REAL THING
The doctrine that a corporation is not a real but merely
a fictitious thing has been frequently asserted. Thus in
a recent New York case the court said, "A corporation is a
mere conception of the legislative mind. It exists only on
paper through the command of the legislature that its men75
tal conception shall be clothed with power."
'4I,.enny, Crim. L. 58; 14 Columbia Law R. 241.
75p. v. Knapp, 206 N. Y. 373, 99 N. E. 841, Ann. Cas. 1914
B 243. See also Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, 52.
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But the better view is that a corporation is not a mere
mental conception-a fictitious thing. It is as much a real
thing as is an army, a class in college, or any other collective unit, and "a collective unit is not only a reality but a
'7
very substantial reality. 6
A CORPORATION IS A FICTITIOUS PERSON
A corporation, though a real thing, is nevertheless 77a
fictitious person, and therefore can have no real intent.
The personality of a corporation is simply the outcome of
metaphor and fiction. "A corporation, in truth and fact, is
assuredly not a person. The law, however, conceives of
it as a person and treats it as a person for most purposes."78
The theory that corporations are personae fictae, though
generally received, has not passed unchallenged. In recent
years another theory has been asserted. According to this
theory, a corporation is nothing -more, in law or fact, than
the aggregate of its members conceived as a unity, and this
unity, this organization of human beings, is a real person
and a living organism possessed of a real will of its own.
The chief expounder and leading advocate of this realistic theory is Gierke, who declares that it is not original
with him but was first taught by Bressler. 79 In England
761 Fletcher on Corporations, Sec. 4: "No one denies the reality
of the company. A group or society of men is a very real thing."
Salmond, Jurisprudence 285; Wormser, 9 M. A. L. 4.
77"The law in creating legal persons always does so by personifying some real thing. Such a person has, to this extent, a real
existence, and it is its personality alone that is fictitious." Salmond,
Jurisprudence, 279.
781 Fletcher on Corporations, Sec. 4; Gray, Nature and Sources

of the Law, 53; "A corporation is a group or series of persons which
by a legal fiction is regarded and treated as itself a person." SalIt is a somewhat curious circumstance
mcnd, Jurisprudence, 280.
that these legal persons, created by one system of law, should have
received extra-territorial recognition, but it has been held that a foreign corporation doing business in a state may be held criminally
responsible. St. v. Paggett, 8 Wash. 579, 36 Pac. 487.
7
TGray, Nature and Sources of the Law, 54.
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it has received sympathetic exposition, if not express support, from Maitland and others.80
A CORPORATION CANNOT HAVE A REAL INTENT
The so-called real will of a corporation is, however,
nothing but the wills of a majority of the directors or
stockholders, and the question whether a corporation can
have a real will or intent depends upon whether there is
such a thing as a collective will or intent. It is submitted
that there is not. There may be agreeing wills or intents,
but not a collective will or intent. A will or intent belongs
to an individual and when we speak of the will of a number
of people on a point, we mean simply that on that point
the wills of these people agree. A collective will or intent
is a mere figment. A corporation cannot have a real intent. 81
IMPUTATION OF INTENT
The fact that a corporation is not a real person and
therefore cannot have a real intent does not necessarily
exempt it from criminal responsibility. The intent of its
representatives may be attributed to it for the purpose of
holding it criminally responsible. 8 2 It has been said that
it is impossible to do this except by a purely arbitrary and
irrational fiction,8 3 but there is nothing peculiar in the process of attributing the intent of its representatives to a corporation. The attribution is of exactly the same nature as
that which takes place in other cases, as, for instance, when
the intent of a guardian is attributed to an infant. In what
cases this attribution is allowed to occur is a question of
law, but so far as the process takes place, and by whatever
ScMaitland, 3
Brown, Austinian
8lThe will of
kel, Holtz, Shaf.

Collected Papers, 304; Pollock, Jurisprudence, 113;
Theory of Law, 22 L. I. R. 178.
Mera corporation is a mere artificial creation.
II, II; Gieb, Lehrbuck, Sec. 87; Gray, Nature

and Sources of the Law, 54; Salmond, Jurisprudence, 284.
8219 Michigan Law R. 205.
8314 Columbia Law R. 469.
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name it is called, it is of essentially the same character. In
the case of all legal persons, except normal human beings,
there is the same fiction of attributing the intent of a man
to some one or thing other than himself.sIt certainly seems that there should be no more difficulty in imputing an intent to a corporation in criminal than
in civil proceedings,15 and that it is as easy to ascribe to
a corporation a criminal intent as it is to impute to it a
sense of contractual obligation."6 "The rules of evidence in
relation to the manner of proving the fact of intention are
necessarily the same in a criminal as in a civil case, and the
same evidence which in a civil case would be sufficient to
prove an intention on the part of a corporation would be sufficient to show a like intention upon the part of a corporation charged with criminally doing an act prohibited by
law. "87
It is contended, however, that the intent of its representatives should not be imputed to a corporation for the
purpose of holding it criminally responsible, because the intent of a servant is never imputed to an individual master
for the purpose of holding him criminally responsible. 8 9 A
master, it is said, is liable for the crimes of his servants
only in two classes of cases: (1) where he has participated
in the intent; (2) in case of crimes which do not involve intent; 90 and as a corporation, being a fictitious person, cannot
participate in an intent, it should be held responsible only
for crimes which do not require an intent. 91 According to
this theory the true rule as to corporate responsibility
84Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, 51.
8sTelegram Newspaper Co. v. Com., 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.

E.

445.
86U. S. v.
MIacAndrews, etc., Co., 149 Fed. 823; Standard Oil
Co v. St., 117 Tenn. 664, 100 S. W. 705.
But see 14 Columbia
Law R. 477.
87U. S. v. John Kelso Co., 86 Fed. 304.
8914 Columbia Law R. 241.
9014 Columbia Law R. 241; 27 Harvard Law R. 589.
9114 Columbia L. R. 469; 14 Columbia Law R. 241; 27 Harvard
Law R. 589.

DICKINSON LAW REviEW

should be that a corporation is not responsible "for any
crimes except those for which, if committed on behalf or
under the general direction of an individual, such individual, although innocent, would be indictable." 92
This doctrine was apparently adopted in a comparatively recent
English case in which Channel, J., after thus stating the
rule as to the responsibility of a master for the crimes of
his servant, said, "It seems to me that exactly -the same
91 3
principle applies in case of a corporation.
In answer to this doctrine it may be said that the assumption that a master is responsible for the crimes of his
servant in which he has not participated only in case of
crimes which do not involve an intent seenis to be incorrect,94 and that therefore even if the rule applicable to individual masters were also applied to corporate masters, a
corporation would jn some cases be held responsible for
crimes of which an intent is admittedly an element, and this
on the theory that the intent of its representatives is imputed to it.
But whatever may be the rule as to responsibility of
an individual master, and even if it be admitted that the intent of a servant is sometimes imputed to the master, it
may be contended that an intent should be imputed to a
corporate master only in cases where it would be imputed
to an individual master. To hold otherwise, it is argued,
would be to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior to
corporations in cases in which it does not apply to individuals. 95
The contrary view, however, is undoubtedly the prevailing one today. The criminal responsibility of a corporate master and an individual master are not the same, and
it has been said that this view is certainly justifiable on the
grounds of policy, if not also on those of logic. 6
9214 Columbia Law R. 469.

92Pearks, Gunston & Lee, Ltd. v. Ward, 2 K. B. 1.
94Huffeut on Agency, 324; Com. v. Johnson, 2 Super. Ct. 317.
D27 Harvard Law R. 589; 14 Columbia Law R. 241.
9014 Columbia Law R. 241.

126

DICKSON LAw REVIEw

An attempt has been made to justify it logically by saying that since in civil cases the intent of its representatives
is imputed to a corporation in order to hold it responsible
for torts, therefore the intent of its representatives must be
97
imputed to it in order to hold it responsible for crime.
But this argument overlooks the fact that the basis of
the responsibility of master in civil cases is not that the intent of the servant is imputed to the master. A master is
responsible for the torts of his servants on grounds wholly
independent of the master's state of mind. 98

In a Rhode Island case it is said: "A principal is held
liable for the torts of his agents, though in no manner at
fault himself, upon the grounds of public policy, which is
the ultimate source of all law, and this is true even where
the tort involves a malicious intention on the part of the
wrongdoer. But public policy certainly does not demand
that a person or association should be punished by the
state through criminal proceedings on account of a wrong
committed by another. This would be contrary to the natural sense of justice. Hence it is held that where the commission of a crime involves the intention of the offender,
this intention cannot be imputed by means of a fiction; actual intention is required. 99
In order to avoid the apparent inconsistency of holding
a corporation criminally responsible in cases in which an individual master would not be so held, it has been suggested
that in case of crimes involving intent the basis of responsibility is not respondeat superior, but the fact that the acts
of the governing officers of a corporation are the' personal
Thus it has been said:
acts of the corporation itself.
"Abandoning the notion that a corporation is an ideal being
and treating it simply as an organization of men, the offi97P. v. Rochester, etc., Co., 195 N. Y. 102; 88 N. E. 22; 21
L. R. A. N. S. 998, 16 Ann. Cas. 837; Telegram Newspaper Co.
v. Corn. 172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 445, 44 L. R. A. 159.
9827 Harvard Law R. 589; 14 Columbia Law R. 241; Corn. v.
Johnson, 2 Super. Ct. 317.
99St. v. Eastern Coal Co., 29 R. I. 254, 17 Ann. Cas. 96.
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cers by which that organization acts appear as integral parts
of the corporation, and their official acts as the immediate
acts of the corporation itself. Apparently some regular officer was concerned in every crime involving an evil intent
of which a corporation has yet been convicted." u 00

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The inapplicability of criminal procedure to corporations may be considered with reference to (1) process; (2)
appearance; and (3) punishment. 1

PROCESS
The courts have readily devised appropriate means of
obtaining jurisdiction of a corporation 2 The early method
was by a venire facias and distress of the corporations
lands and goods,3 but a summons served upon the proper officer is now generally regarded as a valid and appropriate
process and gives the court jurisdiction. 4

APPEARANCE
It was at one time the rule of the common law that a
defendant must appear in person and could not appear by
attorney." It was therefore thought that a corporation
could not be proceeded against criminally. It was a fictitious person and "could not come itself into court and it
could not appear by an attorney" because of this rule. 6
10027 Harvard Law R. 589.
lAs to whether prosecution

of a

corporation

must be by in-

dictment, see Com. v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 206 Mlass. 417, 19 Ann.
Cas. 529.
214 Columbia Law R. 241.
3
Com. v. L. V. R. R. Co., 166 Pa. 1.62.
414 C. J.

879; Com. v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 206 mass. 417, 19

Ann. Cas. 529.
'This was the rule in both civil and criminal cases. Appearance by attorney was the first solution. Later judgment by default was permitted. Com. v. L. V. R. R. Co., 165 Pa. 162.
OP. v. Clarke, 14 N. Y. S. 642; Rex v. Hays, 14 Ont. L. R.
201, Ann. Cas. 1915 B 381. That a corporation might appear by
attorney seems, however, to be recognized in the case of Sutton's
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Later some courts permitted appearance by attorney,
and the rule was evaded in all cases by the device of removing all indictments to a court where appearance by attorney was permitted. 7 Appearance by attorney is now
everywhere permitted, and a judgment by default may be
entered against a corporation which has failed to appear
when properly summoned. 8
PUNISHMENT
A corporation cannot be held responsible for a crime if
the punishment exclusively prescribed for the crime cannot
be inflicted on a corporation. 9 A corporation cannot be
hanged, or imprisoned, or tied to the whipping post. It
follows therefore that when the only punishment prescribed
for a crime is death or imprisonment, a corporation cannot
be held responsible for the crime. 10 For this reason it has
been held that a corporation cannot be held criminally responsible for manslaughter," and it was at one time held
2
that a corporation could not be guilty of contempt."1
The Supreme Court of Canada has, however, expressed
the view that where a statute defines an offense and provides for imprisonment as its punishment, it does not necessarily follow that a corporation may not be fined for the of3
fense so defined.1
It has been suggested that in case of felonies the law,
as a general rule, does not provide punishments applicable
to corporations, 4 and that an amendment of our system of
Hospital, 10 Coke 33, decided in 1613.
7P. v. Clarke, supra; Kenny, Criminal Law, 57.
sCorn. v. L. V. R. R. Co., 165 Pa. 162.
DU. S. v. John Kelso Co., 86 Fed. 304; Com. v. Pulaski Co.
A. & M. Assn., 92 Ky. 200, 17 S. W. 442.
IeUnion Coliery Co. v. Queen, supra; Joplin Mercantile Co. v.
U. S., 213 Fed. 926, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 410.
1Com. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 152 Ky. 320; 157 S. W. 459,
Ann. Cas. 1915 B 617.
12Franklin Union No. 4 v. P., 220 Il.
355; 77 N. E. 176, 4
L. R. A. N. S. 1001.

23Union Colliery Co. v. Queen, supra; 7 R. C. L. 772.
'4Com. v. Pulaski Co. A. & M. Assn., supra; Clark & Marshall on Crimes 171.

DICKINSON LAW REvIEW

criminal procedure providing for adequate punishment for
corporations whose duly accredited agents are guilty of a
felony while engaged in its business and in its behalf, is
needed;15 and in some states it is provided by statute that
"where a corporation is convicted of an offense for the
commission of which a natural person would be punishable
with imprisonment, as for felony, such corporation is punishable with a fine."16
A corporation may be fined, and it is well settled that a
corporation may be held responsible for crimes the pre7
This is also true
scribed punishment for which is a fine.
alternative, fine
the
where the prescribed punishment is in
18
for imprisprovides
or imprisonment, or where a statute
has been
it
onment if the imposed fine is not paid;19 and
a crime
for
held that a corporation may be held responsible
the prescribed punishment for which is in the conjunctive,
20
In such cases though the corporafine and imprisonment.
tion cannot be imprisoned it can be fined.
"The natural inference," says the United States Supreme Court, "when a statute prescribes two independent
punishments is that it means to inflict them so far as it can,
and that if one is impossible it does not2 mean on that ac1 1
count alone to let the defendant escape.
25Wormser, 3 Modern Am. Law, 173.
26N. Y. Penal Code 1932.
17P. v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471, 76 N. W.
9 R. C. L. 722;
735; Com. v. Pulaski Co., A. & M. Assn., supra;
can enforce
state
the
as
far
as
is
"This
14 Columbia Law R. 241.
American Fork City v.
Its criminal laws against a corporation."
See also 20 Harvard Law R.
Charlier, 43 Utah 231, 134 Pac. 739.
204 Fed. 17; U. S. v. Union
S.
U.
v.
Co.
Brewing
321; John Gund
Supply Co., 215 U. S. 50.
111 Pac. 474,
1sSt. v. Bell Springs Creamery, 83 Kan. 389,
166 N. C. 366, 81
L. R. A. 1915 D 515; St. v. Salisbury Ice Co.,
E. 737, 52 L. R. A. 216.
263; 75 Pac. 924.
19Overland Cotton Mills Co. v. P., 32 Colo.
Co., 24 Ont. App. Rep.
But see Atty. Gen. v. Hamilton Street R.
N.

170.

Co.
S. v. Union Supply Co., 215 U. S. 50; C. v. Pulaski
however, Coin. v.
See,
442.
W.
S.
17
197,
Ky.
92
Assn.,
A. & M.
W. 459, 45 L. R. A.
Illinois Central R. Co., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.
158 Fed. 456.
N. S. 344, Ann. Cas. 1915 B; U. S. v. Braun,
21U. S. v. Union Supply Co., 215 U. S. 50.
20U.
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The difference between the punishments to which individuals and corporations are or may subject in these cases
does not violate constitutional provisions relative to equal
protection of the laws .22 "The apparent discrimination
grows out of conditions that cannot be avoided, and the corporation that is favored by the discrimination cannot complain. "23
It has also been held that the fact that a statute defining a crime provides no punishment for it does not exclude
a corporation from its operation, because in such case the
24
common law punishment of a fine may be imposed.
In the case of nuisances there is a strong reason, it is
said, arising from the nature of the punishment, why the
corporation should be held responsible. One of the objects
of an indictment for nuisance is to have it abated, and a
part of the judgment is that the nuisance be abated, and "to
condemn the property of the corporation to destruction upon an indictment against an irresponsible individual who
was employed in the construction of the work, but who has
no interest in the company, and perhaps is hostile to its interests, savors strongly of the injustice of condemning them
unheard. And it is not clear how the sentence is to be executed against the corporation, who are in possession and
in no sense parties to the proceeding. "25
PUNISHMENT OF STOCKHOLDERS
It has been contended that to punish a corporation for
crime is not consistent with natural justice. The punishment of a corporation is in reality the punishment of the
beneficiaries of the corporation on whose behalf its property
22American Fork City v. Charlier (Utah), 134 Pac. 739; Southern R. Co. v. St., 125 Ga. 287, 54 S. E. 737, 5 Ann. Cas. 411.
See also St. v. Belie Springs Creamery Co., supra.
2 W.
H. Small Co. v. Com., 134 Ky. 272, 120 S. W. 361.
24Union Colliery Co. v.

Queen, supra.

See also Nashville, etc.,

Co. v. S., 96 Tenn. 249, 24 S. W. 4.
25St. v. Morris, & E. R. Co., 23 N. J. L. 360.
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is held i. e., the stockholders, for the acts of the representa2
tives by whom it fulfills its functions. 6
So far therefore as the stockholders and the representatives are different persons the criminal responsibility of
corporations is an instance of vicarious responsibility. This
responsibility has been justified, however, on the same principles as are applicable to the vicarious liability of a principal for the unauthorized acts of his agents, for although
the representatives of a corporation are in form and legal
theory the agents of that fictitious person, yet in substance
and fact they are the agents of the shareholders. A corporation is justly held liable for the acts of its representatives because in truth the representatives are the representatives of the shareholders. 27 Thus in Com. v. Pulaski
28
County Agricultural and Mechanical Association, the court
said, "If it be said that such a rule takes the property of innocent stockholders for acts of directors to which they are
not actual parties and of which they have no knowledge,
the answer is that they select the directors, and it is their
business to have those who will see that the corporation busupiness is so conducted as not to injure others or infringe
29
on public right and good order in the community."
A distinction, in this respect, between civil and criminal cases has been suggested. In civil cases an individual
has been injured and is seeking compensation. Balancing
the equities of the plaintiff and the stockholders of the defendant corporation, it has seemed more just that the person
injured should be reimbursed than that an individual stock26 "It is entirely obvious that punishment inflicted upon a corporation is punishment inflicted upon all the living men, women,
and children, who are the substantial owners of its property, and
alike upon the just and unjust, the innocent and the guilty," 14
Columbia Law R. 480.
271f the stockholders and agents are not different persons it
has been argued that to punish the corporations and the agents is
to punish the agents twice. Counsel, arguendo, in Queen v. Great
North of England R. R., 9 A. & E. 315.
2892 Ky. 197, 17 S. W. 442.
29But how about stockholders who have become such since the
commission of a crime.
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holder should be absolved from liability forced upon him
But in criminal
by a representative of the corporation.
for an offense
punishment
adequate
is
cases the theory
upon the corimposed
punishment
against the-state. "The
proportion to
all
of
out
be
may
poration in a criminal case
of
commission
the
by
the benefit gained by the corporation
Ofthereto.
the crime, and never has any logical relation
tentimes no advantage is gained by the corporation, so that
to punish innocent stockholders for an offense committed
by a representative of the corporation can have no basis in
justice. "30

RESPONSIBILITY OF ACTORS
The argument that the individuals who actually commit
the criminal act may be held responsible and therefore it
is unnecessary to hold-the corporation is answered in two
ways: (1) This argument, if carried to its logical conclusion, would exempt all principals from responsibility for
crimes of their agents; (2) the persons who actually do or
order the act are "commonly persons of lowest rank" in a
great majority of cases "'alike unknown and irresponsible."" "It is the clear dictate of sound law not only, but
of public policy, to look rather to the corporation at whose
instance and for whose benefit the wrong is committed
than to the directors by whose order the act was done, who
may be entirely unknown or to the laborers by whom the
work was performed, who in a great majority of cases
would be alike unknown and irresponsible," 32 and "it is a
30Counsel, arguendo, in St. v. Eastern Coal Co., 29

R.

I. 254,

See also 14 Columbia Law Bt. 478.
17 Ann. Cas. 96.
31St. v. Morris & E. R. Co., 23 N. J. L. 360; St. v. Balti.
more & 0. R. Co., 15 W. Va. 362; Com. v. Pulaski Co. A. &" M.
Assn., supra; Com. v. New Bedford Bridge, supra; Reg. v. Great
North of Ehgland R. Co., supra. The liability of the officers of a
corporation for the crimes of the corporation is well discussed in
Rex v. Hays, 14 Ont. L. Rep. 201, 8 Ann. Cas. 380, and note.

See also Reg. v. Great
32St. v. Morris & E. R. Co., supra.
North of England R. Co., supra. "The object should be to reach
and punish the real power and prevent repetition of the offense."
Com. v. Pulaski Co. A. & M., supra.
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part of the public history of our times that many statutes,
those against rebating for example, could not be effectually
enforced so long as individuals only were liable to punishment. It is necessary to punish corporations as well.

"33

CERTAIN CRIMES
It is very generally assumed that even if the foregoing
objections are all overcome, there are still certain crimes so
far outside the scope of corporate powers that a corpora84
It
tion cannot be held criminally responsible for them.
is difficult to see any reason for this distinction or any satisfactory manner of defining it, and no decision has been
found in which the irresponsibility of a corporation was
85
based squarely on this principle.

ULTRA VIRES
The effect of the ultra vires doctrine upon corporate
responsibility for crime is involved in some confusion.
There has been a failure to distinguish an ultra vires act
and an ultra vires business. A crime is always an ultra
vires act, 38 but, as we have seen, it is well settled that a
corporation is not exempted from all criminal responsibility, and is held responsible for many crimes committed in
the course of an intra vires business.
Indeed, the cases go further and hold that even where
a corporation engages in an ultra vires business, criminal
responsibility may attach for crimes committed in the
S3Wormser, 9 AT. A. L. 172.
34U. S. v. Kelso Co.; P. v. Rochester Railway & Light Co.;
Com. v. Punxsutawney Ry. Co., supra. Bishop takes this view.
1 Bishop New Crim. L., Sec, 417.
3514 Columbia Law R. 241.
3OAmerican Fork City v. Charller, 43 Utah 231, 134 Pac. 739.
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course of the business.37 Thus in Louisville Railroad Company v. Commonwealth, 3 in which a railroad company
was held criminally responsible, the court said, "It (the defendant company) would not, had it relied upon the want
of authority under its charter to operate the road at all,
have been allowed to escape punishment. The doctrine
of es toppel applies in such cases with full force."
The only application of the doctrine of ultra vires to
the criminal responsibility of corporations seems to be in
showing that the alleged criminal act was not committed
within the scope of the employment of the representative
who was at fault. A corporation would not be responsible
for a crime committed by one of its servants in the conduct
of an ultra vires business if the conduct of this business was
beyond the scope of the authority conferred.
AUTHORITY OF REPRESENTATIVES
In order that a corporation may be held responsible for
the crimes of its servants -the crimes must have been committed in the course of their employment. 39 But it is not
necessary that the criminal acts should have been expressly
authorized by the stockholders, directors, or superior officers, and even the fact that the criminal acts have been expressly so prohibited is not necessarily a defense.40
377 R. C. L. 766; 2 B. C. 234; Louisville R. Co. v. Com., 130
Ky. 738, 114 S. W. 343, 132 A. S. R. 408; St. v. Baltimore, etc.,
R. Co., 15 W. Va. 362; St. v. Vermont C. R. Co., 27 Vt. 103.
But see Paris v. Com., 4 Ky. L. R., where it Is said, "To be indictable for a nonfeasance the corporation must have power to do
the act omitted, and for a misfeasance, the act done must come
within the scope of its corporate duty."
See also P. v. Rochester
R. & Light Co., supra.
38
3

Supra.

914a C. J. 874; Fletcher on Corporations, See. 5382; Com. v.
Ohio & P. R. Co., 1 Grant. 329; Rex. v. Panton, 14 Vict. L. R.
836.
4014a C. J. 874; Overland Cotton Mills Co. v. P., 32 Colo. 263,
75 Pac. 924, 105 A. S. R. 74; New York Central R. Co. v. U. S,
212 U. S. 481; Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S. W.
705, 10 L. R. A. N. S. 1015; St. v. Louisville etc., R. Co., 91
Tenn. 445, 19 S. W. 229.
But see 27 Harvard Law R. 589 and
St. v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 15 W. Va. 362.
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CRIMES INVOLVING INTENT
The doctrine that a corporation cannot be held responsible for crimes involving intent, which was asserted in the
earlier cases and has been adhered to in some of the more
recent cases, is difficult to apply. The meaning of the term
criminal intent is always a matter as to which there is considerable conflict and debate, and the courts have not undertaken to define clearly its meaning as used in connection with the doctrine under discussion. 41
The doctrine cannot mean that a corporation cannot be
guilty of a crime which involves a mental element, for, as
every crime involves a mental element, the doctrine, thus
interpreted, would exempt corporations from all responsibility for crime.42
The doctrine may, perhaps, mean that a corporation
cannot be guilty of a crime which involves:
(1) An intention of a particular consequence; or
(2) Knowledge of a particular circumstance; or
(3) A motive.
INTENTION OF A PARTICULAR CONSEQUENCE
The doctrine that a corporation cannot be held responsible for a crime which involves an intention of a particular
consequence is illustrated by those cases which hold that a
forms of
corporation cannot be held responsible for those
3
homicide which involve an intention to kill.4
It has been said that under the modern rule a corporation could be held responsible in such cases. Thus it has
been said, "Suppose the directors of a corporation * * * *
41In St. v. L. V. R. R., 90 N. J. L. 372, the court said, "We
need not consider what crimes may be included in the last exception." In Com. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S. W.
459, Ann. Cas. 1915 B. 617, it was said that crimes involving criminal intent were often grouped under the three fold designation,
treason, felony, or breach of peace.
42Kenney Crim. L. 37 et seq.
3
4 See Com. v. Illinois Central R. Co.; St. v. L. V. R. R.,

supra; 1 Bishop New Crim. L. See. 418.
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duly determine that it is for the best interests of the corporation to have a certain person murdered. * * * They accordingly hold a stockholders' meeting and the stockholders
approve the determination of the directors. A gunman is
hired with instructions to do the job neatly and with dispatch. The person is accordingly murdered. The corporation is indicted for murder. Is there any logical reason
44
why it should not be held?"
KNOWLEDGE OF A PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCE
The crimes for which corporations were held responsible in the earlier cases did not involve knowledge of particular circumstances as an essential element,45 but in more recent cases corporations have been held responsible for false
pretences," knowingly depositing obscene matter in the
United States mails, 47 knowingly and fraudulently concealing certain property, 8 and knowingly soliciting the immigra9
tion of contract laborers.4
MOTIVE
The doctrine that a corporation cannot be held responsible for a crime involving a criminal intent has been interpreted as meaning that a corporation cannot be guilty of a
crime involving a motive and there are cases which supportport this view; 50° but in some of the more recent cases it
is held that a corporation can be held responsible for a
crime involving a motive, as, for example, larceny."'
44Wormser in 9 M. A. L. 175.
4514 Columbia Law R. 469.
46St. v. Salisbury Ice Co., 126 N. C. 366, 81 S. E. 737, 02 L.
R. A. N. S. 216
47U. S. v. N. Y. Herald Co., 159 Fed. 296.
48U. S. v. Young & H. Co., 170 Fed. 110.
49Grant Bros. Construction Co. v. St. (Ariz.) 114 Pac. 955.
5020 Har. Law R. 321; Androscoggin Water Power Co. V.
Bethel Steam Mills, 64 Me. 441 (larceny). Com. v. Graustein &
Co., (Mass.) 95 N. E. 97.
51p. v. Tyson & Co., 50 N. Y. L. J. Jan. 13, 1914; 14a C. J.
874.
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INTENTION TO DO ACT
In a number of cases it is said that a corporation may
be held responsible for crimes which involve merely an in52
tent to do the prohibited act.
Under this doctrine a corporation could not be held
responsible for crimes involving a motive, for a motive is
not an intent to do the act which is done, but is a species of
intent which passes beyond the act done and relates to the
object for the sake of which the act is done.
But whether the doctrine of these cases excludes
crimes which involve an intention of particular consequences
or knowledge of particular circumstances depends upon
whether the term act, as used by the court, was meant to
include the circumstances and consequences of an act as
well as its origin, or was limited to that part of the act
which is called its origin, and was meant to exclude the
circumstances and consequences. 5"
WALTER HARRISON HITCHLER.

U. S., 212 U. S. 481; U. S. V.
52N. Y. Central R. Co. v.
Relso Co., 86 Fed. 304.
53
See Dickinson Law Review, vol. 24, p. 224.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

MOOT COURT
ESTATE OF WILLIAM HOLMES
Wills-Parol Contract To Make a NVil-Irrevocability of Same
Baumrind, for the Plaintiff.
Schatz, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MRS. STEVENSON, J. In an issue devisavit vel non to determine the validity of a will the following facts were found.
William Holmes, the testator, five years before his death
made a parol contract with his brother John by which he agreed
that if John furnished him a home, fed, clothed, and took care ot
him till death, he, William, would devise all his property to
John. William drew up a will complying with the contract and
He then made the proallowed It to exist for over four years.
John has performed
pounded will which ignored the contract.
all the conditions of the contract on his part.
The question is whether under the above circumstances the
first will could be revoked by the testator and a second will, inconA
sistent with the terms of the contract, substituted therefor.
will Is, in its own nature, ambulatory and revocable during the,
life of 'Its maker. But in the case at bar the first will was not
a will merely but also the evidence of a contract which has been
completely performed by the plaintiff. There can be no doubt
that the agreement constituted a valid contract between the testator and his brother. Was that contract specifically enforceable?
If so, an equitable estate vested In the plaintiff which could not
be defeated by a subsequent devise of the property. The agreement on the part of the testator was to transfer an interest in
land. It was, therefore, within the Statute of Frauds. There
was not, perhaps, sufficient part performance to take the case
out of the Statute under the Pennsylvania decisions which seem
to find possession a requisite of such part performance. We think,
however, that the will, made as it was pursuant to the contract,
constituted a sufficient writing to take the case out of the Statute.
In Johnson v. McCue, 34 Pa. 180, where the will was held to
be "not revocable like an ordinary will but to be deemed a contract in writing within the Statute of Frauds," the agreement to
devise was also in writing and the two papers were held to constitute the contract; but In Smith v. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341; Shroyer
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v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310; and Park v. Park, 39 Sup. 212 the contract
was parol and the will itself was held to constitute a sufficient
writing to take the case out of the Statute. In these cases the
will was put in evidence but In the case of Brinker v. Brinker,
7 Pa. 53, where the will was alleged to have been suppressed by
a brother of the plaintiff, Chief Justice Gibson held, "the Statute
of Frauds interposes no bar to it-because the terms of it were
put in writing in the father's will; and though the will itself is
lost, the substance of the devise is proved."
In the recent case of McGinley's Estate, 257 Pa. 478, there
was a parol contract to devise and wills executed in compliance
with the contract. In an appeal from a decree admitting a later
will to probate the court held that an Issue devisavit vel non
should have been awarded to determine the existence of the alleged contract between the testator and the contestants and
whether the latter performed their part of the agreement, on the
theory that the contract, If valid, could be set up to defeat the
probate of the later will.
We think that this case and the others cited are decisive of
the one at bar and that the contract between William Holmes
and his brother John, evidenced by proof of the contents of a will
made in pursuance thereof, is specifically enforceable and renders
the later will of William Holmes invalid, and we decree accordingly.
OPINION OF SUPREME! COURT
If the contract to devise, followed by the devise, makes unenforceable a later will inconsistent with the contract, it would be
Idle to admit this later will to probate. It would be, in fact, no
will. Hence we think the issue devisavit vel non is properly granted in order to determine whether probate should be given to the
later will. McGinley's Estate, 257 Pa. 478.
A more serious question is, do the alleged contract and facts
attending it, put the will made in pursuance of it, beyond supersedure by a later will? We have found it impossible to harmonize
the cases, in which the will disposes of land, and the contract
to make it as compensation for services, Is oral. The statute of
frauds opposes difficulties to the enforcement of such a contract.
Cf. Henderson v. Chaplain, XXIV. Dickinson Law Review, 215.
We have decided, that the appeal from the decree of the Orphans Court must be DISMISSED.
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KELLER v.

Negligence-Injuries

DICKINSON

From Runaway

Horse-Ownership

of Horse

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dickinson owned a horse which he loaned gratuitously to his
friend Martin for a week.
Martin negligently handled this horse
during the week with the result that it ran into and seriously inJured Keller.
In this trespass for damages, he claims that he
should receive $750.00 damages.
The court entered judgment on
the verdict for the amount.
No unfitness of Martin to be entrusted with the horse is suggested.
Kravitz for the Plaintiff.
Schatz for the Defendant.
OPINION

OF THE COURT

MILLER, J.
This is an action brought by Keller, who was
injured by a horse belonging to Dickinson, the defendant, and
driven by Martin, a gratuitous ballee.
The question with which
the court is confronted is, whether a bailor who has gratuitously
bailed a thing which brought about the injury can be held responsible for the acts of negligence committed by the latter.
This
question has been answered by the Courts of Pa. unequivocally
as follows.
"If one lets or hires to another a horse to be used exolusively
for the purpose of the latter, the owner of the horse is no way responsible for the negligent manner in
which the horse may be
used."
Bard and Wenrich v. Yohn, 26 Pa. 482.
"If a man loans a hired horse for the use of another, the owner of the horse Is no way responsible for the negligent manner
which the horse may be used," Jordan v. Vare, 67 Sup. 202.
The decision of the Lower Court must be reversed.
OPINION OF SUPREME

COURT

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

HURTZ v.

SLOAN

Contract-Sale-Breach-Partial DeliveryMeasure of DamagesContract Price--Market Price-Sales Act of May 19, 1915, Sect.
67, P. L. 543.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sloan agreed to sell 15 barrels of flour at $10 per barrel to
Kurtz as he should demand them.
On his demand, 8 barrels were
delivered and paid for.
Sloan failed to deliver the rest on demand.
Kurtz sues for damages, claiming the difference per barrel
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.between the $10 price agreed upon and the market price of the
flour at the time when delivery should have been made, which
was $12 per barrel. Kurtz had not purchased any flour as a substitute for that which Sloan failed to furnish.
Hirst for the Plaintiff.
Doehne for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
The defendant has broken his contract and
R. MORGAN, J.
the question which presents itself is the amount of damages to
which the plaintiff is entitled.
Sec. 67, subsection 3, of the Sales Act of 1915, P. L. 543,
reads as follows: "Where there is an available market for the
goods in question, the measure of damages, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damages of a greater amount,
is the difference between the contract price and the market or
current price of the goods at the time or times, when they ought
to have been delivered, or, if no time was fixed, then at the time
of the refusal to deliver." According to the decisions rendered after the passage of this act it has been declared that it is not necessary for the vendee, when the vendor has failed to deliver, to
buy or attempt to buy from some other source, but the mere failure to deliver is sufficient breach to allow the vendee the difference between the contract and market price.
Upon the breach of contract by a vendor in failing to furnish
his vendee goods contracted for, the latter is entitled to recover
That loss is measured by the differcompensation for his loss.
ence in the market value of the goods, which the vendor had contracted to furnish, and the contract price which he had agreed to
accept.
This is the measure of damages whether the vendee has
purchased goods to take the place of those the vendor was to
have purchased or not, except where special damages are claimed.
Hauptman v. Pa. Working Home for Blind Men, 258 Pa. 427.
This interpretation of Section 67 subsection 3 of the Sales Act
Seward v. Pa. Salt
has been follofed in two very recent cases.
Mfg. Co., 266 Pa. 457, and Iron Trade Products Co. v. Wilkoff
Co., 272 Pa. 172.
In view of the above stated authorities judgment is rendered
for the plaintiff and damages amounting to $14 with interest will
be allowed.
OPINION

OF SUPREME COURT

The decision of the learned court below, makes extended reThe measure of damages is prescribed
marks by us unnecessary.
by the Sales Act, and the cases interpreting it.
It may be that the vendee has been in fact profited by his
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not being required to pay for the seven barrels which the vendor.
failed to tender.
Finding it unprofitable to buy them elsewhere
even for the price he agreed to pay, he is not precluded from enforcing as damages, the difference between the price he agreed to
pay and the price he would have had to pay, had he bought in the
market, though he did not buy in the market. AFFIRMED.

ATKINS v. COAL COMPANY
Conveyances-Coal Land-Sale of Surface--Reservation of Right
To Move Without Liability For Surface Support-Surface Support-Nature of Right-Easement-Mines and Mining
STATEMENT

OF FACTS

This is an action for damages by one Atkins against the Coal
Company for disturbing the surface, leaving no support for it,
while engaged in mining coal.
The facts of the case are briefly
these, viz: X owning land In which was coal, transferred the surface, and in the deed stipulated that there should be no duty in
excavating the coal of leaving a sufficient support for the surface.
X later conveyed the coal to the defendant but in the deed declared that freedom from the duty of leaving a support to the
surface was not conveyed.
Subsequently X released to Atkins,
the plaintiff, in this case, the right to disturb the surface by mining operations.
Later the Coal Co. disturbed the surface, leaving
no support for it.
Kauffman, for the Plaintiff.
Barnard for the Defendant.
OPINION

OF THE COURT

W.
YOUNG, J.
It is the settled law of Pennsylvania that
in the absence of an express waiver or the use of words from
which the intention to waive clearly appears, the grantee of minerals, takes the estate subject to the burden of surface support.
Such a right is not to be taken away by mere implications from
languages which does not necessarily imply such a result.
Penman v. Jones, 256 Pa. 416; Hines v. Union Connelsville Coke Co.,
271 Pa. 219.
Under the facts of the case at bar, the defendant Coal Co.,
by the conveyance of X to it of the coal under the land in question, was liable to support the surface, since the deed specifically
stipulated that freedom from the duty of leaving a support to the
surface was not conveyed.
The learned counsel for the defendant contends, however, that
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X could not impose a liability of supporting the surface upon the
defendant since he had already conveyed the surface and had stipulated in that conveyance that he should not be liable for surface
support. That having conveyed the surface, and then the coal, X
could not have a more right of support for the surface.
We do not think, however, that this contention can be supThe right of surface support which X retained was not
ported.
It was a proprietary
It was more than that.
a mere easement.
Penman v. Jones, supra. That right was of considerable
right.
value, as is evidenced by the fact of its subsequent sale to the
plaintiff.
The rights of the defendant company are dependent upon the
The grantor expressrights they received from their grantor, X.
ly stipulated in his conveyance of the coal to the defendant Company that they did not have the right to disturb the surface. He
The plaintiff under
later conveyed that right to the plaintiff.
The defendthat conveyance received a definite property right.
ant Company violated that right by disturbing the surface, leavThe plaintiff is entitled to damages for
ing no support for it.
such violation.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
When land containing coal, is divided, the surface becoming
the property of A, and the coal, that of B, B is under a duty not
to disturb the surface, unless he is released from this duty by
Here X the owner of the land, (coal and surface)
agreement.
transferred the surface, stipulating in the deed, that he should
not be under the usual duty of leaving a sufficient support for the
X later conveyed the coal
surface when making his excavations.
to the defendant but excepted the immunity from liability for
The immunity was
This he could do.
disturbing the surfaces.
not inseparable from this ownership of the coal.
The surface
The coal then, belonged to the Coal Company.
belonged to Atkins. The right, in excavating coal, to disturb the
He could make no use of
surface, belonged to neither, but to X.
That was
this right, unless he regained ownership of the coal.
He has since released the right to Atkins, so that
a possibility,
nobody has now the right to cause subsideness of the surface.
With this
Such is the doctrine of Penman v. Jones, 256 Pa. 416.
accords the decision of the learned court below, whose judgment
in

favor of Atkins is APFIRMED.
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BANK v.

SARAH

COOPER

Promissory Notes-Husband and Wife-Wife as Accommodation
Maker-Evidence--Competency
of Witnesses-Surviving Party
TO Contract-Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Suit on a note made by the defendant, payable to her husband
and by him indorsed to the plaintiff.
The husband Is dead, defendant offers herself to prove, that she made the note for her
husband's accommodation.
Also that the note was discounted
for the husband who received the proceeds.
The court held (a)
the burden was on the defendant to prove the fact that would
nullify her note, (b) she was not a competent witness. Verdict for.
$2,000.
Bachman for the Plaintiff.
Reese for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ZICKEL, J. There are three questions which appear from
the acts of this case; first, whether the burden of proof is upon the
defendant; second, whether she is competent to prove that she was
an accommodation maker; and third, if she was competent to prove
that her husband received the proceeds.
The first of these questions is the most easily disposed of. In
the case of Bank v. Moore, 231 Pa. 362, the court held that the
burden is upon the defendant to prove that the note comes within
the exception to her general right to contract. But that this Is
the barest presumption and can be overthrown by competent evidence is manifest In the case of Patrick & Co. v. Smith, 165 Pa.
526, where it was held that "liability is not determined alone by
the form of the obligation.
If the object was to evade the disability created by the statute, the fact and not the form will determine
the liability."
Then it must be determined whether or not Mrs. Cooper was
a competent witness to prove such facts as would nullify the note.
Under the Act of May 23, 1887, she is clearly incompetent to prove
any transactions between her husband and herself, hence she cannot show that between them the husband alone was liable.
Therefore the trial court committed no error in excluding evidence offered for that purpose.
But this does not dispose of the competency of the witness to
prove that her husband received the proceeds.
That may have
been a transaction between her husband and a third party, In which
case she would have been competent under the Act of 1891.
"If
such relevant matter occurred between himself and another person
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who may be living at the time of the trial and may be competent
to testify and does so testify at the trial."

Had this been the case

the court would have committed a reversable error in excluding the
testimony of Mrs. Cooper.

But the question was not raised by the

counsel for the defendant and we cannot consider it in rendering a
decision.
This case seems to fall within the rule of Bank v.

Donnelly, 247

Pa. 518 which case holds that the burden of proof is upon the defendant to prove facts which would show that the note was made
for the accommodation of another, and further holding that the defendant herself is incompetent to testify to matters occurring between herself and her husband prior to his death.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The note in suit was made by Mrs. Cooper.

It was payable to

her husband, who had it discounted by the plaintiff bank. The bank
had two parties to whom to look for payment, Mrs.
Mr. Cooper.

Mr. Cooper had no action against his wife, until he

was compelled to pay the note.
It

is suing on one of them.

a party.

Cooper and

The bank had then two contracts.

To this contract Mr. Cpoper was not

How then does his death, impair the testimonial capacity

It plainly cannot. The Farmers & Mechanics Bank
257
Pa. 518, cannot be accepted as to this point, as dev. Donnelly,
cisive. It is inconsistent with Strause v. Braunsenter, 4 Superior
of his wife?

263, the opinion in which was written by that excellent jurist, Judge
No right to defeat the recovery of the money, represented
Rice.
by this note from Mrs. Cooper has passed to the plaintiff. The Act
of 1887, clause e, sect. 5, applies only where the right of the deNo right of
ceased has passed to the other party, to the record.
the husband has passed to the bank. We hold that Mrs. Cooper
was a competent witness.
We agree with the learned court below in thinking that the
burden was on the defendant to prove the facts which exempted
She
Her power to make contracts is general.
her from liability.
must prove that her case is within the exceptions to her power.
Bank v. Powe, 231 Pa. 362; F. & M. Bank v. Donnelly, 247 Pa.
518.
We are obliged to reverse the judgment
court. REVERSED.

of the learned

trial
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JACKSON v. HARTIMIAN
Negotiable Instruments-Failure to Demand Payment-Tender--Interest and Costs-Act of May 16, 1901, Sect. 70, P. L. 194
Borys, for the Plaintiff.
Broomall, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MORINES, J. This is an action in assumpsit by Jackson, the
payee of a note, payable at a named bank. Jackson negligently failed to demand payment at the bank, Hartman having left the necessary fund for three months after the note matured. He then
withdrew the deposit. He claims, (a) that he has been discharged;
(b) that in any case, he is not liable for interest, nor for the cost of
the suit.
Was Hartman discharged of his obligation to pay the note? We
think not. It does not appear that he sustained any loss or injury
through the plaintiff's negligence or failure to demand payment at
the bank when the note matured or during the three months following. We may safely infer from the facts that the defendant had
the use of the money after it was withdrawn from the bank. If
there had been a loss the case would be ruled by the doctrine of
Harvey V. Girard National Bank, 119 Pa. 212, where the Supreme
Court said, p. 221:
"It was his (the holder's) duty to collect the draft; he attempted to do so; the plaintiff (drawer) provided the money to
meet it, and that money was lost through the negligence of the
holder ....... (and) as between the holder and the plaintiff
<drawer) the latter was discharged both as to thedraft and the
consideration therefor, the negligence of the former resulting
as it did to the prejudice and loss of the plaintiff. This is a
familiar principle of commercial law. Chitty on Bills,. 354."
Section 70 of the N. I. L. (Act 16 May, 1901, P. L. 194) provides:
"Presentment for payment is not necessary in order to
charge the person primarily liable on the instrument, but If the
Instrument is by its terms payable at a special place and he is
able and willing to pay It there at maturity, such ability and
willingness are equivalent to a tender of payment upon his
part."
In construing this section the Supreme Court in Dewees v.
Iron Co., 248 Pa. 202, held that the failure to present the paper
does not discharge the obligation where the person sought to be
discharged is primarily liable and that the maker's "ability and
willingness to pay," at the place fixed for payment at maturity Is
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equivalent to a tender of payment, but that a tender of payment is
not a discharge of the obligation.
The next question is whether the defendant's "ability and will.
ingness to pay", which is equivalent to a tender, relieves him of
'liability for interest.
He deposited the money to meet the note in
the bank. It remained there or there were sufficient funds to his
credit to meet the note for the period of three months.
The tender
was not kept up.
The defendant had the use of the money after
he withdrew it from the bank and there is no reason why he should
not be liable for interest from the time of the withdrawal.
In Miller v. The Bank, 5 Whart. 502, it was held that while the defendant
kept funds in the bank to meet the particular demand, he prevented
interest, the deposit being equal to a tender.
But the defendant
was held liable for interest on the bill from the date on which he
withdrew the money from the bank.
The last question for determination is whether the tender under Section 70 of the Act of 1901 is effectual to bar the plaintiff's
recovery of the costs of suit. Under the Act of 1705, I Sm. L.
49, See. 2, (Pa. Statutes Sec. 8932) it was provided:
"That in all cases where a tender shall be made, and full
payment offered by discount or otherwise in such specie as the
party by contract or agreement ought to do, and the party to
whom such tender shall be made doth refuse the same, and yet
afterward will sue for the debt or goods so tendered, the plaintiff shall not recover costs in such suit."
This statute was construed to mean that a tender made before
suit will not bar plaintiff's recovery for costs, unless the money is
paid into court. Cornell v. Green, 10 S. & S. 14; Miller v. Bank,
(supra); Wheeler v. Woodward, 66 Pa. 158; Harvey v. Hackley, 6
Watts 264; Sheredine v. Gaul, 2 Dall 190; Seibert v. Kline, 1 Pa.
38; George v. Sunday, 1 Woodward 364; 15 C. J. Sec. 146.
The rule under the act of 1705, supra, and the cases just cited
was adopted in the Act of March 12, 1867, P. L. 35 Pa. Statutes
Sees. 17279 and 17280, which provides in substance that the tender
must be kept up in order to deprive the plaintiff of judgment for
costs.
See, Pine Grove Vitrified Brick Co. v. Miller and Co., 43
C. C. 414.
In Bradshaw v. Saxton, 68 Superior 499, the court, construing Sec. 70 of the Act of 1901, supra, said:
"When he (the defendant) went into the County Court, he
neither offered any money nor any judgment, and the plaintiff
has at all times been compelled to obtain adverse judgment or
take nothing.
We, therefore, give judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the
principal, with interest from the time the defendant withdrew the
deposit from the bank together with costs of suit.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT

The note was payable at a bank.
Had it been presented at
the bank, it would have been paid. But it was not presented.
It
does not follow that the note has become uncollectable. The maker,
has allowed sufficient money to pay it, to remain in the bank fcr
three months. He has thus lost the use of this money. It is clear
then that he should not be compelled to pay interest on the debt for
these three months. The money was at the command of the plain.
tiff and he has chosen not to make use of it, while dissuading the
defendant from making any use of it.
At the end of three months, the defendant withdrew the money
from the bank, and used it.
The failure of plaintiff to demand it,
at maturity, did not extinguish the debt.
It became the duty of
the debtor, when he withdrew the money, to search for the creditor,
and make tender of the debt to him. Such is the duty of debtors,
generally. He was in default, in not doing so.
The duty to pay the money, arose, when the deposit was withdrawn from the bank. Interest then began to accrue upon it, and
for that interest the defendant is liable.
The failure of the defendant to pay the debt, after withdrawing
his deposit, has made it necessary for the plaintiff to bring this
suit. He succeeds in It, and, as in other cases, he should recover
costs.
The decision of the learned court below is therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
X

COMPANY v. JONES

Promissory Note-Evidence--Parol Evidence--Contemporaneous
rol Agreement

Pa-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Note for $1000 drawn by X, principal, and Jones, surety. Joint
and several note. The note promises to pay the X Company six
months after date. Jones defends that it was agreed between the
parties at the time of making the note that the plaintiff would collect certain debts due to X and "apply them on the note, and that
nothing should be collectable upon the note; and that plaintiff has
collected $4000 out of the debts but had applied the money collected to other claims. The lower court rejected the defense because
It contradicted the note. Now this appeal.
C. Davis for the Plaintiff.
Forcey for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
JURCHAX,

J.

The appellant in

this case signed a note as
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surety with the verbal agreement that certain funds should be ap.
plied on the payment of the note if collected. The money, sufficient to pay the note, was collected but applied to other debts and
in an action against the appellant on the note he set up the verbal agreement as a defense, but the lower court rejected it at the
trial. This action of the court is assigned as error and submitted
for our review.
Written instruments, in general, may be varied, explained or
even modified by extraneous evidence, written or oral, where such
evidence is a part of or necessary to a proper understanding of
the principal agreement. Walker v. France, 112 Pa. 203; Greenwalt v. Kohne, 85 Pa. 375; Plunkett v. Roehm, 12 Superior Court
86.
Notes and instruments of a like nature cannot, because of their
form and generality, contain the entire agreement which they evidence. The detailed and more or less remote terms of a note are
governed by circumstances, commercial usage and oral understanding and may be varied, according to the Intention of the parties, to
almost any extent without at all affecting the vital or essential
terms of the note. Convenient verbal agreements are often entered into as part of the principal contract contained in the note con.
temporaneously with the assumption of obligations upon the note.
Such sgreements are admissible as evidence In a suit upon the note,
to explain, supplement, or modify the principal agreement, to show
failure of consideration, to prove place of payment, etc. Collateral
agreements of this nature are admitted to determine properly the
rights of the parties to a note and may be set up defensively in an
action thereon. This phase of the law of bills and notes is expressive and declarative of the adaptation of commercial paper to particular business transactions and to the expedition of modern business
as a whole. The principle, however, must be rationally carried out
and is applicable only so long as the parol agreement is not at variance or irreconcilable with the terms of the written note. Ross v.
Espy, 66 Pa. 481; Marquardt's Estate. 251 Pa. 73; Second National
Bank v. Yeager, 268 Pa. 167.
And the trial court must admit in toto the testimony relating
to the circumstances of the making of the Instrument. Brenneman v. Furniss, 90 Pa. 186.
Specifically, an agreement made at the time of the making of
a note that it is to be paid out of certain funds Is admissible in evidence and a good defense. Forcite Powder Co. v. Hawley, 40 Superior Court 412; Keller v. Cohen, 217 Pa. 522; Second National
In Faux v. Fitler, 223 Pa. 568,
Bank v. Yeager, 268 Pa. 167.
where the same problem was decided as is presented to us in this
case, the Supreme Court said (quoting Justice Williams in Clinch
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Valley Coal & Iron Co. v. Willing, 180 Pa. 165), "The existence of
a contemporaneous parol agreement between the parties under the
influence of which a note or contract has been signed, which is violated as soon as it has accomplished its purpose in securing the
execution of the paper, may always be shown when the enforcement of the paper is attempted. It is plain fraud to secure the execution of an instrument by representations as to the manner in
which payment shall be made, differing in important particulars
from those contained in the paper, and after the paper has been
signed, attempt to compel literal compliance with its terms, regardless of the contemporaneous agreement without which it would
never have been signed at all."
These sentences adequately express the court's view of the present case.
As between the parties
making the note, the appellant should have been allowed to prove
the collateral contract.
Had he been able to establish it at the
trial it would have been a good defense in relieving him from the
obligations on the note. For this definite and sufficient reason we
hold that the trial court erred in its action in refusing to admit
evidence of the collateral agreement and the collection of money,
etc., relative thereto.
REVERSED and v. f. d. n. allowed.
OPINION OF SUPRDEME COURT
The note promises to pay $1000, six months after date.
Jones,
defendant, offers to show that the payee agreed to collect certain
debts due to the principal maker, and that nothing should be collectible upon the note. There is great contradiction in the decisions
of Pennsylvania, as to the permissibleness of contradicting by parol, the terms of a writing. Some cases conceding it, are Faux v.
Fitler, 223 Pa. 568; Kennett Square Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 209 Pa.
313; Keller v. Cohen, 217 Pa. 522; Baker Loan & Trust Co. v.
Diehl, 253 Pa. 353.
The Judgment of the learned court below Is AFFIRMED.

BOOK REVIEWS
Trial by Jury.
A Brief Review of its Origin, Development
and Merits and Practical Discussions on Actual Conduct of Jury
Trials, etc. By Robert von Moschziskero LL.D., Chief Justice of
Pennsylvania.
Geo. T. Bisel Co., Philadelphia, 1922, pp. X, 452.
The first three chapters give a brief summary of the early forms
of trials which led up to trial by jury and of the various views advanced as to its origin and development.
The final sentence is
this: "I want you, the lawyers of the future, to grow in understanding of this great historic institution, to believe in its worth,
and to do your utmost to keep It high in the regard of the public
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and the esteem of the profession." In Section 79, he says: "If he
who presides over the trial is a real judge, desirous of reaching
only a correct decision, according to law, the system affords him
such broad opportunities for properly guiding and controlling the
triers of fact, and of correcting their mistakes, or giving other
triers the opportunity so to do, that it may be viewed as an ideal
institution, in the general run of cases, for determining disputes
between private parties, as well as for the proper administration of
the criminal law." In Section 81, he says: "It is, to my mind.
about the most perfect instrument which can be devised as an aid
to organized society In administering justice between the state and
its citizens and between man and man."
The author's very entensive personal experience has enabled
him to write an eminently practical book, as well as one interesting from an historical and theoretical standpoint. It is based on
lectures prepared for students and tells both what to do in trying
cases before juries and how to do it. Some of the subjects so discussed are the selecting of the jury; opening and developing the
case; nonsult; examination of witnesses with objections and exceptions; improper remarks by court or counsel to jury; submitting exhibits to them; points for charge; binding instructions; judgments
n. o. v.; and particularly the formalities required in each step of
the case to be kept in mind in -the course of a trial to make up the
record on appeal. Two chapters discuss the relative functions of
court and jury and one the constitutional guaranties.
The book will be indispensable to a Pennsylvania lawyer. It
discusses important lines of Pennsylvania decisions which depart
from established rules of jury trial and the philosophy back of
them. The author admits an endeavor to make the book less formal
and more human than the usual law book. In this he has succeeded admirably and the result is a book as readable as it is informing
and authoritative. The tables in the appendix for ready reference
in the matters of challenging jurors in criminal cases will be invaluable to judges and lawyers practicing in the criminal courts.
Real Estate and Conveyancing In Pennsylvania with Forms
and Decisions to date, by Louis W. Robey, of the Philadelphia Bar,
George T. Bisel Comand Instructor in Temple University, 1922.
pany, Philadelphia.
This book, of over 700 pages is distributed into chapters, whose
titles indicate the scope of the work. The names of some of the
chapters, are Estates in Real Property, Title, Capacity to take, hold
and convey; Agreements of Sales, Deeds, Mortgages, Ground
Rents, Recording of Deeds, Title by Matter of Record, Title acquired by Adverse Possession, Eminent Domain, Dedication; Title
by Descent, Wills, Escheat and Forfeiture, Boundaries, Landlord
and Tenant, Real Estate Agents and Brokers, Building and Loan
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Associations, Searches; Settlements, Title Insurance Companies.
From page 436 to page 597, is a series of valuable forms. The
list of cases cited runs from page 599 to page 615. This is followed by a list of statutes cited, covering six pages.
It is needless to say that all the decisions cannot appear in a
book of this magnitude, dealing with so many and so Important
topics. But, the salient principles have been stated with brevity
and unusual clearness, and the ordinary practitioner will find
quickly and in very readable form, yery many of the fundamental
doctrines which the courts have elaborated in the course of decades. We notice that a very large percentage of the authorities
referred to is of recent date. The forms given are well approved.
terse and clear, and the possession of them must be a solace to
the questioning conveyancer or lawyer.
The author refers' to certain of his "Pennsylvania predecessors,
who have written on Real Estate law, Mitchell, Fallen and Lad.
ner. His product loses nothing by comparison with theirs, not
to call attention to its recency.
The book can be cordially commended to the notice not merely of students of law, but of lawyers, either just beginning or in doubt, about one or more of the
problems that confront the practitioner.
Cases on Trade Regulation, selected from English and American decisions, by Herman Oliphant, Professor of Law in Columbia
University. The West Publishing Company, 1923.
This is the latest born member of the American Case-book series. Its theme is of manifest importance. The book covers over
1000 pages, and the number of decisions embraced in it, suggests
the frequency and importance of the topics treated in them. Their
classification is illustrated by the titles given to the various parts.
There are three "parts" and an appendix. Part one deals with
Contracts in Early English Trade, contracts concerning the use of
skill or enterprise, contracts accompanying the purchase of property, contracts instrumental In apportioning business; contracts Instrumental in creating a monopoly or a combination.
Part II, dealing with Competitive Practices treats In nine chapters, of the privilege of competing; intimidation and molesting, disparaging competitor's goods or services, appropriating competitor's
trade values (the demand for his goods or services, his trade information, his devices for demand creation, the uniqueness of his
goods or services) inducing breach of competitor's contracts, boycotting, requiring exclusive dealing, unfair price practices, unfair
advertising.
Part III, treats of Conbinations, in four chapters, of which the
first deals with object of combination; the second with the form of
combination, under which are considered unity of action; unity
of management, and unity of ownership; the third with multiple
phase combinations; the fourth with rights and liabilities under
federal statutes.
The appendix contains the Sherman anti-trust act, the federal
trade commission act, the Clayton act, and the Webl act.
To the increasing number of attorneys who are interested In
the regulations of trade which are becoming so numerous and so
intrusive, this volume may be commended as containing many of
the most Important adjudications, both of state and federal courts.
The price of the book is $5.50.

